

What Difference Does a Union Make?

Banana Plantations in the North and South of Guatemala

September 2020

Dr. Mark Anner

Director, Center for Global Workers' Rights Professor, Labor and Employment Relations The Pennsylvania State University





Acknowledgements

This report would not have been possible without the considerable support and insights from numerous organizations and individuals. The author is especially grateful to the survey team and their supporters. This includes Pablo Quino, César Guerra, Carmen Molina, and Eduardo Juárez. Without their valuable efforts, none of the analysis presented in this report would be possible. The leadership team of the Sitrabi union offered insightful analysis and deeply appreciated support, as did Julio Coj of Unsitragua. In Guatemala, Fresh Del Monte, Frutera Atlántica, the Ministry of Labor, researchers at Association of Investigation and Social Studies (ASIES) and the Institute of Labor Studies (INET), and the Association of Independent Banana Producers (APIB) were all generous with their time and provided many insights. Luis Fuentes of the Guatemala office of the Solidarity Center greatly facilitated my trip logistics, was an excellent travel companion, and provided many valuable insights on employment relations in Guatemala. Jason Boccaccio at the Solidarity Center headquarters in Washington, D.C. was a constant source of support, knowledge, and encouragement. At Penn State, Luis Mendoza furnished meticulous and invaluable research assistance. Matthew Fischer-Daly provided highly insightful background research on certification programs. Alistair Smith provided meticulous and crucial feedback. Finally, my thanks go to Tara Mathur for her invaluable editing and formatting skills.

¹ One other person assisted with the survey, but her name is not included her because she is working in a non-union packing plant, and she wanted her collaboration to be anonymous. The author is grateful for her support.

What Difference Does a Union Make?

Banana Plantations in the North and South of Guatemala

Executive Summary

- 1. Guatemala is the third largest exporting country of bananas in the world, and the largest exporter of bananas to the United States. Within Guatemala, bananas, coffee, and garments are the country's three largest exports. Of these, banana exports are now the country's most important export.
- 2. Guatemala achieved this growth in banana exports by greatly expanding production through national producers on Guatemala's southern coast, where wages are lower, conditions of work more precarious, and unions are non-existent. While banana production was once concentrated in the unionized northern region, today 85 percent of employment is in the non-union southern region.
- 3. This report finds that non-unionized workers earn less than half the hourly pay of unionized workers and work 12 hours per week more. Conditions of labor are also more precarious for workers working for nationally-owned enterprises relative to enterprises directly owned by banana multi-national corporations (MNCs).
- 4. Non-union workers are 81 percent more likely to face verbal abuse than union workers. One of the most notable findings of this report is that 58 percent of women in non-union banana packing plants face sexual harassment at work compared to eight percent of women at unionized packing plants.
- 5. All of the above labor rights violations take place at enterprises that are inspected by private certification programs, including Global G.A.P. and Rain Forest Alliance. At 25.5 percent of unionized workplaces and 85.9 percent of non-union workplaces, management tells workers what to say to the certification inspectors before the inspectors arrive.
- 6. In the context of Covid-19, since bananas are a food, banana production is considered an essential service, and all workplaces union and non-union are operating. All workers also report physical distancing inside the packing plants, access to protective masks (which they need to wash), and hand sanitizer.
- 7. At unionized workplaces, to avoid Covid-19, unions demanded special transportation to achieve physical distancing while traveling to work. And the Sitrabi union negotiated the shift distribution of workers in packing plants in order to respect physical distancing protocols while also ensuring no workers lost hours of work. Workers at non-union workplaces have received no special transportation assistance and report no physical distancing while traveling to work. Union representatives also received additional training on proper hygiene to avoid the virus. Non-unionized workers have not received any such training.

Introduction and Report Overview

Banana production and distribution represent one of the world's oldest global supply chains. It has been built on a very long history of labor repression, low wages, and union avoidance (Chapman 2007: 8; Schlesinger and Kinzer). Yet, there are also notable cases of successful unionization, collective bargaining, and improved conditions of labor (Frundt 2005). Guatemala has been an important part of this history of global banana supply chains. It was one of the first countries where United Fruit – the first mega banana company – set up operations,² and it has become the third largest exporter in the world. In Guatemala, the banana sector is also home to one of the stronger unions in region, Sitrabi, which represents Del Monte workers in the northern region. Unions also represent Chiquita workers in the same zone.

For many years, most banana production was concentrated in this northern region with these strong unions. However, in recent years, production has increasingly shifted from the unionized north to the non-union southern region through outsourcing to local producers. It is now estimated that 85 percent of employment is in the non-union southern region.³ As production grows in this region, the viability of unions in the northern region to maintain their gains is increasingly in jeopardy.

The report sets out to examine these dynamics. It does so through a survey of 210 banana workers, visits to the field, and stakeholder interviews. The findings are striking. Non-unionized workers earn \$1.05 per hour compared to \$2.52 per hour earned by unionized workers. They also work on average 68 hours per week compared to 54 hours per week worked by unionized workers. Non-union workers are also 81 percent more likely to face verbal abuse than union workers. And 58 percent of women in non-union banana packing plants face sexual harassment at work, compared to eight percent of women at unionized packing plants.

In addition, all of the above labor rights violations take place at enterprises that are inspected by private certification programs, including Global G.A.P. and Rainforest Alliance. At 25.5 percent of unionized workplaces and 85.9 percent of non-union workplaces management tells workers what to say to the certification inspectors. At unionized workplaces, union representatives also receive special Covid-19 health training and have access to special transportation to ensure physical distancing. Non-union workers have not received training nor do they have access to special transportation with physical distancing.

In the sections that follow, this report examines global trends in banana production and situates Guatemala within those trends. It then takes a closer look at trends within Guatemala. Here it can been seen how bananas have come to dominate exports. In the third section, the report summarizes and analyzes the research findings. The final section provides conclusions and recommendations.

²The United Fruit Company was established in 1899 as a merger of two banana exporting companies, one based in Jamaica and the other based in Costa Rica. Two years after the founding of United Fruit, Guatemalan dictator, Estrada Cabrera, conceded huge tracts of land to the company to begin production there.

³ Author's interviews, Guatemala, February 2020.

Guatemalan Banana Production in the Global Context

Banana grows best in warm, tropical climates with an abundance of rainfall. This means that most bananas consumed in developed market economies (notably in the United States and Europe) are grown in Latin America and a few Asian and African countries. Guatemala was one of the very first countries in which United Fruit began growing and exporting the fruit well over a century ago.

Today, four historic multinational corporations dominate the industry: Chiquita (Brazilian owned; Swiss headquartered), Fresh Del Monte (Jordanian owned, U.S.

headquarters⁴), Dole (U.S./Irish owned, U.S. headquartered⁵), and Fyffes (Japanese owned, Irish headquartered). In addition, giant supermarket chains Walmart, Tesco, Carrefour, Aldi, and Lidl are increasingly purchasing bananas not only from these large brands but also directly from local producers.⁶

Costa Rica, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, and Ecuador have also been large exporters that began under United Fruit's control. In Asia, the Philippines rose to be the top exporter and today is the second largest ex-




Figure 1

porting country after Ecuador. In Africa, Cote d'Ivoire has expanded rapidly in recent years to have the largest exports among African exporting countries. In the contemporary period, Guatemala held a position as the fifth largest exporter, behind Ecuador, the Philippines, Costa Rica, and Colombia.

However, in 2013, the value of its exports surpassed that of Colombia. And in 2018, its exports surpassed that of Costa Rica. This makes Guatemala the third largest banana exporter in the world today. [See Figure 1.]

^{*}See www.bananalink.org.uk/. In 1996, the ITA Group—a firm of the Abu-Ghazaleh family (Palestinians from Jerusalem)—bought Fresh Del Monte. The company was incorporated in the Cayman Islands and is headquartered in the United States. Family member Mohammad Abu-Ghazaleh (a Jordanian citizen) has served as Chairman and CEO since 1996. Mohammad Abu-Ghazaleh and the ITA Group took the company public on the New York Stock Exchange in 1997. As of 2018, Mohammad Abu-Ghazaleh owned a 36.8% equity share in the company. Other members of the family from Jordan, Lebanon, and Chile own the next 23% of shares, ensuring the family a continued majority ownership stake in the company.

⁵ The publicly-traded Irish company, Total Produce, owns 45% equity stake in the company. U.S. citizen, David H. Murdock, also owns a 45% equity share. Murdock is the Chairman of Dole and Carl McCann, of Total Produce, is the Vice Chairman.

⁶See: http://www.fao.org/economic/est/est-commodities/bananas/bananafacts/en/#.XrtKIRNKhhE; Also, BananaLink: https://www.bananalink.org.uk/

For the United States market, Guatemala is number one. Thirty-nine percent of all bananas sold in the United States are produced in Guatemala. Costa Rican bananas make up 19 percent of U.S. imports, and Ecuador and Honduras are in third and fourth place with 15 and 10 percent, respectively. [See Figure 2.]

In the United States, in 2019, importers paid USD 0.21 per pound for bananas and sold those bananas for USD 0.57 per pound. These prices and this price differential have barely changed over the past decade. [See Figure 3.] Taking inflation into account, the real price paid to producers has been in decline for the past four years.

Banana Link conducted careful research to calculate the distribution of who gets what when bananas are sold. What they found is that 5.5% goes to planta-

tion and packing house workers, 15.5% goes to plantation companies, 16% goes to transport by truck and ship, 12.5% to transport and ripening and repacking, 8.0% goes to transport to warehouses and stores, and 42.5% goes to retail. [See Notes below* and Figure 4, page 6.] What this indicates is that, for one pound of bananas sold at 57 cents, workers receive three cents.




Figure 2




Figure 3

For 'banana split' calculations in European banana value chains, undertaken by French research group BASIC see p.29: https://www.bananalink.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ banana value chain research FINAL WEB.pdf

^{*} Notes on banana cost distribution: Estimations based on information about Pacific South large-scale nationally owned producer costs for fruit contracted on annual FoB contract basis. Estimations are based on average logistical costs to/from Puerto Quetzal, San Tomas or Puerto Barrios to West Coast, Gulf and East Coast ports and on to ripening facilities and stores across the USA. Costs at each stage include profit margins to economic operators (except for labor along the chain). When traded by a multi-national brand, there is a variable additional margin taken by the brand, thereby reducing the share of value going to the retailer. Greenhouse gas emissions along the chain are concentrated in transport at all stages including the consumer journey to the store; a much smaller percentage of total emissions are attributable to cardboard packaging, fertilizer and agrochemicals.

Dominant Actors in Banana Global Supply Chains

Of the four major banana corporations noted above that dominate global banana trade, three have a very strong presence in Guatemala: Chiquita, Fresh Del Monte, and Dole. Of the supermarkets selling these brand bananas, the dominant player for Guatemalan bananas is Walmart, which also purchases bananas directly from Guatemalan farms. For example, currently 30 percent of Del Monte's Guatemalan exports go to Walmart. Walmart has attempted to use its market leverage to squeeze down by as much as one dollar per box.8 It is not as easy to squeeze multinational fruit companies as it is to squeeze local suppliers because fruit MNCs have brand name recognition that allows them to push back. But the squeeze is still substantial and contributes to pushing production away from unionized facilities in the north to non-union facilities

in the south. While historically the banana companies owned their own farms and packing plants, today in Guatemala only Fresh Del Monte and Chiquita have significant directly-owned facilities.

Financialization also plays an important role in the global banana industry. Not long ago, all three major corporations were publicly traded companies. Today, only Del Monte is publicly traded. Chiquita went private in 2014 and is now controlled by Brazilian capital, the Cutrale and Safra Groups, and headquartered in Switzerland. Dole went private in 2013 under the ownership of David H. Murdock. In 2018 Murdock sold a 45% equity share to the Irish company, Total Produce, which is a publicly-traded company. See Figure 5.




Figure 5
Major Multinational Corporations in Guatemalan Banana Supply Chains

⁷ Author's interviews, Guatemala, February 2020.

⁸ Ibid

See: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-cutrale-safra-groups-complete-acquisition-of-chiquita-300016760.html

¹⁰See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dolefoods-takeover-ceo/doles-90-year-old-ceo-seals-deal-to-take-company-private-idUS-BRE97B0GX20130812

While it is true that publicly-traded companies feel the constant pressure of investors to improve the return on investment, and thus keep costs low, this does not mean that privately held companies are less likely to squeeze down on costs and thus labor. Indeed, since Chiquita went private in 2014, it has not raised the wages of its workers in Guatemala until July 2020.¹¹

One advantage of publicly traded companies is that they are required to be more transparent with their business operations. An examination of Fresh Del Monte's most recent 10K Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing reveals that, globally, only 38 percent of its bananas are produced on company-controlled facilities. The remaining 62 percent are purchased from independent growers.¹² The 10K form also indicates that Del Monte's banana sales in 2018 totaled USD 1.7 billion, on which it earned USD 84 million in gross profit. This is a slight reduction from its USD 1.8 billion in sales the prior year, and a significant reduction in gross profit, down from USD 113 million.¹³ This decline in profits can be partly linked to a squeeze down on price demanded by large supermarket chains, most notably Walmart.¹⁴




Figure 4 Banana Sales, Who Gets What

¹¹ In July 2020, the union finalized collective bargaining with Chiquita. As per the CBA, starting on July 4, 2020, the minimum wage per day rose to Q92.12, a 2% increase from the prior wage. From January 1, 2022, until the end of the CBA (March 31, 2023) the minimum wage per day will be Q99.49, an 8% increase. This CBA applies to the nine facilities, and it was signed by six unions that form part of the Comisión de Solidaridad Intersindical de Sindicatos Bananeros (COSISIBA). Sources: Author's interviews, Guatemala, February 2020, and email correspondence with union representatives, August 2020.

¹²See: http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001047340/c20bc78c-a4e6-4fa8-8c2c-9ae4aad19c7b.pdf
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001047340/c20bc78c-a4e6-4fa8-8c2c-9ae4aad19c7b.pdf
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001047340/c20bc78c-a4e6-4fa8-8c2c-9ae4aad19c7b.pdf
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001047340/c20bc78c-a4e6-4fa8-8c2c-9ae4aad19c7b.pdf
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001047340/c20bc78c-a4e6-4fa8-8c2c-9ae4aad19c7b.pdf
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001047340/c20bc78c-a4e6-4fa8-8c2c-9ae4aad19c7b.pdf

¹⁴ Author's interviews, Guatemala, February 2020.

Banana Production in the Guatemalan Context

Banana supply chains - made notorious by United Fruit in Latin America – go back over a century. By the end of the 19th century, United Fruit controlled 75 percent of the global banana market (Chapman 2007). For over one hundred years, the company controlled transportation and distribution, and aggressively dominated land and labor (Koeppel 2009: 56). United Fruit's first major landholding in Guatemala was on the Atlantic coast. In the 1930s, it expanded into the Pacific coast in the Tiquisate area as it sought to avoid the Panama disease which had ravaged its plantations on the northern coast (Chapman 2007: 106). To facilitate the process, it struck a deal with Guatemalan ruler, General Jorge Ubico (1931-1944) that, among other incentives, guaranteed the company low wages; insisting workers not be paid more than 50 cents per day. (Schlesinger and Kinzer: 70).

The Ubico regime was finally brought down by a coup d'etat led by junior army officers. The officers then called for elections, which were won in 1945 by Juan José Arévalo. The new President not only allowed for press freedoms, he also enacted one of Latin America's most progressive labor reforms. The "Guatemalan Spring" would last for a decade. Jacobo Arbenz was elected President in 1951 and began enacting an agrarian reform that seized idle land from United Fruit, paying the company the value of the land that it had declared when paying taxes. United Fruit responded by using its close ties to the United States government to convince the latter that the Arbenz government had to be removed. The coup of 1954 put an end to reforms and ushered in an era of violent state labor repression. Unionists on banana plantations were among those targeted for repression (Forster 2003).

The first Guatemalan labor unions were formed *de facto* in the 1920s by railroad, banana and port workers (ASIES 1991; Goldston 1989). In 1921, 2,000 port workers in Puerto Barrios went on strike and were

soon joined by United Fruit banana plantation workers demanding not only better salaries but also an end to United Fruit's "monopolistic privileges" (ASIES 1991: 171). Port workers went on strike again in 1923. Bakers, shoemakers, and railroad worker strikes would soon follow. In response to this growing labor mobilization and pressure, on December 5, 1925, the government established the National Department of Labor (ASIES 1991). This was followed by the Labor Law of 1926 (Goldston 1989). This period of labor mobilization came to an abrupt end during the dictatorship of Ubico (1931-1944) as labor organizations that had formed in the 1920s were "repressed viciously" (Goldston 1989: 6).

When the dictatorship came to an end, Arévalo's Labor Code of 1947 allowed for unionization of urban and rural workers in the private and public sector. In June 1947, the first labor union to be recognized under the new labor law was the union of workers of the United Fruit Company. The union was then known as Setufo. By 1953, the Ministry of Labor recorded 536 unions and 100,000 unionized workers, which accounted for 10 percent of the workforce. Following the US-backed coup of 1954, the dictatorship of Colonel Castillo Armas issued Decree 21, which dissolved all unions formed under the Arévalo/Arbenz regime. Workers were allowed to "reconstitute themselves free of 'communist' influence," but continued repression and legal restrictions resulted in a drop to 50 unions, which represented two percent of the workforce (Goldston 1989).

In the 1970s, banana production grew once again on the northern coast, away from the core labor unrest on the Pacific coast, and labor organizing grew. In 1972, Setufo became the union of banana workers of Izabal, Sitrabi. This was because United Fruit sold its property to the transnational Fresh Del Monte Inc. (Cooper and Quesada 2015). As Sitrabi began to escalate is activism, and many of its leaders were killed in the

¹⁵ Today, Sitrabi is the oldest private sector union in the country (Cooper and Quesada 2015).

process. Another group of unionists organized workers on Chiquita plantations on the northern coast, and began a series of strike activities and other protests. During these years, Guatemala became known as the most dangerous place in the world to be a unionist. More unionists were killed in Colombia, but Guatemala has a smaller population, and the per-capita killings in Guatemala have been higher. In 1980 alone, 110 labor unionists were assassinated (Goldston 1989).

While it is now over two decades since the Guatemalan civil war came to an end, repression of trade union activists continued. From 2004 to 2018, 101 labor unionists were killed. We were able to document the location of 81 of these killings. Figure 6 shows the geographic dispersion of the killings and illustrates that many of the killings have taken place in the banana growing regions. [See Figure 6.] Appendix One provides details on the names, dates, and unions of each trade unionist killed.




Figure 6 Number of Trade Unionists Killed in Guatemala by Department (2004-2018)¹⁶

¹⁶ The author thanks Luis Mendoza for his meticulous work in gathering these data and developing this map.

While bananas have been an important export crop for over a century, for much of Guatemala's history, coffee was king. Indeed, twenty years ago, the value of coffee exports (USD 575 million) was 4.3 times the value of banana exports (USD 135 million). Also dominating the Guatemalan export economy have been garment exports, known locally as maquila production. Indeed, as garment exports boomed starting in the 1990s and early 2000s, Guatemala sought to shift from traditional export crops to manufacturing. However, garment production did not bring the promise of development as wages remained low and repression of union rights was severe. And, as world leaders liberalized trade in garments through the phase-out of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) and the entry of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), production shifted to Asia, and Guatemalan garment exports flattened. Indeed, the flattening of garment exports happened after the implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2006. That is, whatever benefit CAFTA-DR was intended to have on garment exports in Central America, this was largely mitigated by the adverse impact of the end of the MFA and the entry of China into the WTO.

During this time, coffee prices spiked due to shortages in Brazil in 2011, but then dropped again. And as banana exports declined elsewhere in the world due to disease and other factors, they grew steadily in Guatemala. As a result of all these trends, by 2019, banana exports surpassed that of coffee and garments, making bananas Guatemala's most important export. [See Figure 7.]

One question this report seeks to answer is: At what price did the banana sector grow so rapidly and did Guatemala rise to become the largest exporter of bananas to the United States and the third largest exporter to the world? One common answer is that production shifted from the highly unionized north (Atlantic) coast to the non-union, locally-owned enterprises on Guatemala's southern (Pacific) coast. Currently, of the 75,000 workers in the sector, 10,000 work in the north and estimated 65,000 work in the south.¹⁷ Yet, how exactly do wages in the north and south compare? What about hours of work, treatment of workers, prevalence of verbal abuse and sexual harassment? Most notably, what difference can a union make? These are the questions this project sought to answer.




Figure 7

¹⁷ Author's interview, Sitrabi representatives, February 2020.

Part II

Research Findings:

What Difference Does a Union Make?

Research Methods

To explore the impact of subcontracting and union avoidance on the conditions of labor in the Guatemalan banana export industry, this project conducted a survey of 210 workers between September 2019 and March 2020. Of these, 85 worked in the south and 125 worked in the north. The surveyed covered field workers (95) and workers in the packing plants (112). The ratio of workers in the field versus the packing plant varied from facility to facility. One estimate indicated 57 percent of workers labored in the fields and 43 percent worked in the packing plant. While almost all workers in the field, who cut and haul the bananas, are men, many (if not most) workers in packing plants are women. Overall, according to the survey findings, women make up 33 percent of all workers.

All told, the survey included 138 men and 72 women. Most workers were between the ages of 26 and 39 and had, on average, 5.7 years of education. The workers interviewed produced bananas for Del Monte (84 workers), Chiquita (44 workers) and Dole (81 workers). Of these, 47 percent worked directly for the MNC, Del Monte or Chiquita. The remainder worked on outsourced facilities, mostly for Dole on the southern coast. [See Appendix for summary statistics.]

All surveys were conducted by Guatemalans with roots in the banana worker communities. Three of the surveyors had once worked in the sector. All female workers were interviewed by female surveyors. Surveys were conducted away from the workplace in trusted community centers or union halls. The survey findings were complemented by visits to banana production sites on the northern and southern coasts and to Guatemala City for stakeholder interviews by the primary investigator. The sections that follow summarize and analyze the findings.

While implementing the survey, the primary investigator travelled to Guatemala to conduct interviews with all relevant stakeholders in the north, in the south, and in Guatemala City. This included interviews with labor unionists, workers, multinational enterprise managers, managers for locally-owned farms, local researchers, government officials from the Ministry of Labor, and trade associations. In order to protect the identities of interviewees, the names, locations, and exact dates of interviews are not included. Rather, they are referenced simply as "author's interview, Guatemala, February 2020."

Findings

As will be seen ahead, the research findings present a clear picture of the difference that a union can make. Unionized workers earn more, work fewer hours, face less sexual harassment, and have safer workplaces, including during the Covid-19 pandemic. The problem is that the percentage of workers represented by unions in Guatemala's banana industry is in decline. In the 1980s, Sitrabi had 5,000 affiliates. Membership declined in the aftermath of hurricanes Mitch and Agatha, which resulted in farms closing. Union repression, including the kidnapping of Sitrabi leaders, further contributed to the decline. During this time, Guatemalan employers began attempting to displace labor unions with *solidarismo*, a form of management- controlled committees that weakened labor's collective

¹⁸ Author's correspondence with Sitrabi union representative, May 13, 2020.

power. By the 1990s, Sitrabi had 3,000 affiliates. At this writing (May 2020), the union has 2,900 affiliates, 25 percent of whom are women and 75 percent are men.

The union represents 94 percent of workers on directly-owned Del Monte facilities in the north. According to the union, Del Monte now produces 25 million boxes of bananas each year in the north and 115 million boxes (82 percent of the total production in Guatemala) in the south. Hence, the most important goal of recent collective bargaining negotiations has been to ensure job stability for unionized workers in the north. Negotiations take place every three years, and the next negotiations are set for 2021.19 The problems of job loss in the unionized north and job growth in the unorganized south are not limited to Del Monte. Chiquita abandoned five unionized farms in the north and now produces the same amount of fruit once produced on those northern facilities on outsourced facilities in the south. All told, there are now 10,000 banana workers in the north and 60-70,000 workers in the south.

The move to the south creates a clear squeeze on wages, as will be seen below in the survey findings. What the interviews reveal is an additional squeeze in terms of work intensity. In the packing plants, workers each pack 56 boxes per hour. Each worker is individually tracked and workers are reprimanded if they go too slowly. Yet, according regulations of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security, work must be in accordance with "productive capacity."²⁰ This indicates that pushing workers at a pace of production beyond that which a reasonable person would consider humanly possible is a violation of Social Security regulations. But workers constantly complained about the pace of production. Indeed, this work intensity leads many worker to the use of drugs and "energy" drinks that have been banned in many European countries. Others consume drugs.²¹ As one observer noted with regard to the long hours of work, intense pace of production, and the use of drugs to

make it through the day: "Our young people are getting old quickly."²²

One of the most basic points of comparison is the wage level of workers. By examining total monthly wages, the first observation that can be made is that the average worker earns USD 474 per month. From that point of reference, differences become immediately apparent. Workers in packing plants earn somewhat more than workers in the fields, USD 488 compared to USD 449. Most of these lower paid field workers (who cut and haul the bananas to the packing plant) are men, which helps to explain why women earn slightly more than men.

Workers producing for Del Monte earn the highest monthly wage (USD 674), followed by Chiquita (USD 405), followed by Dole (USD 308). This is partly because Del Monte and Chiquita have both directly-owned facilities as well as outsourced facilities, whereas Dole has outsourced all of its production to locally-owned facilities, and outsourced facilities pay USD 330 compared to the USD 636 per month paid by facilities directly-owned by banana MNCs.

Examining the data closely revealed that, given the way we sampled the workers, with all but one exception, all the surveyed workers in the north were unionized and all the workers in the south, except one, were not unionized. As a result, we combined north/south and union/non-union into one comparison: unionized north versus non-union south. What the data indicate is that unionized workers in the north earn an average of USD 586 per month compared to USD 308 per month for unorganized workers in the south. This gives us a union differential of 90.3%. Combining all these factors, it can be seen that the best wages are paid at unionized Del Monte facilities in the north and the lowest wages are paid at non-union Chiquita and Dole facilities in the south. [See Table 1.]

¹⁹ Author's interview with union leaders, February 2020.

²⁰See: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/2063/Acuerdo%20410%20Reglamento%20EMA.pdf

²¹ Author's interview with workers, Guatemala, February 2020.

²² Author's interview, Guatemala, February 2020.




Table1

In addition to the wage differential already noted above, the second striking difference between the groups is in the hours of work. On average, non-union workers in the south labor 68 hours per week and unionized workers in the north labor 54 hours per week. This is a remarkable 25.9% difference. Indeed, many non-union southern workers told us that they worked 12 hour day, six days a week. [See Figure 8.]

What is even more remarkable is that workers on the non-union southern facilities report not being paid for overtime. Rather, they are paid one lump sum for a given period of time. The pay stubs, which were examined by the research team, do not indicate hours of work. What this reveals is that the wage differential is even more substantial




Figure 8

than that which is noted in Table 1. Dividing monthly earnings by hours of work²³ gives an hourly wage of USD 1.05 for non-union workers in the south. Doing the same calculations for the unionized workers in the north indicates an hourly wage of USD 2.52. [See Figure 9.] This suggest an hourly union wage differential of 204 percent.

Low wages have a direct and severe impact not only on the workers, but also on their families. For unorganized workers in the south, 68.2 percent indicated that their salary never covers their basic needs, compared to reports of the same by 45.6 percent of unionized workers in the north. More notably, 30.6 percent of unorganized workers in the south report buying less nutritious food for their children compared to only 5.6 percent of unionized workers in the north. Unorganized workers in the south are also less likely to be able to afford needed medical expenses and are more likely to have debts relative to unionized workers in the north. Very significantly, non-union workers in the south, on average, are only given 20 minutes to eat lunch compared to 60 minute lunch breaks for unionized workers in the north. Finally, only 1.2 percent of unorganized workers in the south report overtime hours to be voluntary compared to 57 percent of unionized workers in the north. [See Table 2.]



Figure 9

In interviews, workers in the south repeatedly referred to the verbal abuse they experience from supervisors. One woman said, "They treat us like dogs."²⁴ A high level of verbal abuse was confirmed by the survey. The vast majority – 73 percent – eported being yelled at by supervisors. For unionized workers in the north, 40 percent reported being yelled at. [See Figure 10.] Interviews and an open-ended survey question contextualize these data. Often, workers are yelled at in very vulgar ways to work faster. Most common was the expression by managers ordering workers to work (*apurate*) followed by a vulgarity (e.g., "Work faster you piece of

	No Union (South)	Union (North)
Salary Never Covers Basic Needs (% yes)	68.2%	45.6%
Buy less nutritious food for children	30.6%	5.6%
Don't make needed medical expenses	16.5%	5.6%
Have debts	72.9%	52.8%
Have a place to eat lunch (% yes)	67.1%	79.8%
Time to eat lunch (minutes)	20.0	60.0
Time for snack/break (minutes)	3.6	9.0
Overtime hours are voluntary (% yes)	1.2%	57.0%

Table 2

²³ USD 308 per month divided by 4.3 weeks per month divided by 68 hours of work per week.

²⁴ Author's interview, Guatemala, February 2020.

s***, "Work faster you lazy a**," etc.). Workers were very often threatened with dismissal if they didn't pick up the pace of work (e.g., "Work faster or I'll fire you, son of b****"). When yelling at women, expressions were often vulgar and gendered (e.g., "b****, go faster.")

Even more striking than verbal abuse is the discrepancy in the levels of sexual harassment at unorganized facilities relative to unionized workplaces. A significant majority of women (58 percent) reported being sexually harassed on the job at non-union packing plants in the south compared to eight percent of women who experienced sexual harassment at unionized workplaces in the north. [See Figure 11.]

One worker stated, "The supervisor said if I accepted him as my lover he would treat me well and help me at work." Another explained, "When I was a temporary worker, the supervisor said if I accepted what he asked of me that he would make sure I got a permanent contract." A third noted, "The boss told me that if I didn't give in to him, he would have me fired." One worker noted that many women are sexually harassed even before they begin work. The harassment begins with the job interview. Some women feel pressure to have sexual relations with a manager in order to get a job.²⁵ Male workers did not report sexual harassment. What they reported was the need to pay a bribe to a supervisor in order to get a job. One said it was common for supervisors to demand one-third of a worker's first paycheck in return for hiring someone new.²⁶

As for why sexual harassment is much lower in the unionized facilities, Carmen, a union leader for Sitrabi, explained: "If a man touches me, I can inform the company. The administration has created a lot of fear about this among managers. Managers have been fired [for sexual harassment]. We have examples of this. There is more respect now. And if someone doesn't respect us, the issue goes to the union-management committee."²⁷




Figure 10




Figure 11

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

Occupational Safety and Health and Covid-19

Health and safety is an enormous and historic concern for banana workers (and the surrounding communities), most notably due to the excessive use of pesticides. One worker in the south noted, "The chemicals they use give me a headache. They provide masks, but these masks are meant to last six hours. We have to use the same mask for three months."²⁸

For this reason, proper access to protective equipment is a fundamental part of worker safety. The vast majority of workers in both the north and the south, 94 percent, reported that they receive protective equipment at work. This includes mainly rubber gloves and smocks. And 78 percent said they considered their workplace to be safe in terms of occupational health and safety. However, the union difference becomes apparent when comparing what happens when protective equipment is lost or damaged. In the case of unorganized workers in the south, 83 percent reported that management discounted the cost of replacement gear from their salaries. In contrast, only eight percent of unionized workers in the north reported such discounting. [See Figure 12.]

union report physical distancing inside the paccking plant and access to protective masks and hand sanitizer. In the unionized facilities in the north, Del Monte and Chiquita spread workers out into shifts to lessen the number of people in packing at one time and they installed plastic barriers between workers who have to work in close proximity to each other at the wash basins.




Figure 12

The references above to protective gear does not cover protective equipment for Covid-19. This survey was concluded before Covid-19 became an issue in Guatemala. However, it was possible to ask some follow up questions of workers and worker representatives via phone interviews about how employers at unionized and non-unionized workplaces were addressing the issue of worker safety. Once again, the union difference became apparent. Since bananas are a food, banana production is considered an essential service, and all workplaces – union and non-union – are operating at the time of this writing. All workers, union and non-

Also at unionized workplaces, to avoid the Covid-19 virus, unions demanded special transportation to achieve physical distancing while traveling to work. Workers at non-union workplaces have received no such special transportation assistance and thus reported no physical distancing while traveling to work (although many workers did not need this service since they use a personal motorbike to get to and from work). Union representatives also have received additional training on proper hygiene to avoid the virus. Non-unionized workers have not received any such training.

²⁸ Ibid.

Certification Programs²⁹

Certification of banana enterprise compliance with labor standards emerged prominently in the 1990s. Today, most banana plantations are inspected by at least one certification program. Different organizations are involved in each certification: The standard-setting organization develops the standards; the accreditation organization accredits or approves organizations to audit companies against the standards; the auditing agency audits or assesses compliance with the standards; and the company seeking certification hires the auditing agency. Many of the standard-setting and accreditation organizations are non-profit NGOs, and many of the auditing agencies are for-profit companies. The standard-setting organization is the most visible, often bearing the same name as the certification. The presence of representatives of trade unions and laboradvocacy organizations is minimal – only one of the standard-setting organizations has a trade union representative on its advisory board, Social Accountability International (SAI). The company seeking certification pays the auditing organization for the service of the audit. Certification generally lacks worker participation in the audit process and certification decision. Auditors do not typically interview workers in settings without management. Furthermore, the current practice of most certifications is to maintain audits confidential between the audit company, the company obtaining certification, and the accreditation and standard-setting organizations.

Since certifications of labor standards emerged contemporarily in the 1990s, trade unions, labor-advocacy NGOs, and other observers have raised concerns and recommended revisions. In the 2000s and into the 2010s, Chiquita's restructuring involved sale of many previously-owned plantations, followed by Chiquita's purchasing of bananas from these same, now independently-owned plantations. In the late 2000s, the union at a Chiquita-owned plantation in northern

Guatemala communicated concerns about the certification SA8000 to its standard-setting organization, SAI. Representatives from SAI met with the union members and learned that one of their concerns was the labor practices of independent suppliers of bananas to Chiquita located in southern Guatemala that were previously owned by the multinational. The workers assessed that so long as Chiquita could report use of the certification, the workers at non-certified suppliers to the company would have little chance of gaining respect for their labor rights. The complaint exposed a limitation of certifications, that companies may selectively certify facilities while benefiting from lower-cost product obtained via labor practices that violate the certification standards at non-certified facilities.

Of the non-profit (NGO) certification programs, Rainforest Alliance (RA) has the largest presence in the Guatemalan banana sector. Rainforest Alliance states that its certification program aims to establish and maintain sustainable agriculture by developing standards, auditing farms against the standards, providing training to farm owners and workers on compliance with the standards, and market products produced in compliance with the standards (Rainforest Alliance and Utz 2018). Global GAP, a private voluntary program, does not directly address labor relations.

In 2000, 15 percent of all bananas sold internationally were from RA-certified plantations. In the 2000s, sales of RA-certified bananas, chocolate and coffee surpassed \$1 billion. RA added labor standards to its sustainable agriculture certification standards. As of 2017, RA operated with a nearly \$40 million budget, with revenues split evenly between fees for service and grants.³⁰ The Rainforest Alliance Certified is a trademarked brand communicated with a consumer-facing product logo, the image of a frog meant to indicate the health of an ecosystem. Organizations obtain RA certification and rights to use the RA frog brand on their products by passing audits in which they are evaluated against the

²⁹ The background on certification programs was developed by Matthew Fischer-Daly. The author thanks him for this contribution.

³⁰See: https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/Rainforest%20Alliance%202017%20IRS%20990%20Report.pdf

RA Sustainable Agriculture Standards. RA publishes a list of certified facilities online.³¹ For an analyzable format, RA provides a spreadsheet of RA-certified banana producers as of 2017 with farm names, contacts, and certification information. The data indicates that 563 banana producers are RA-certified. They are concentrated in Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. Guatemala has the 4th highest number of RA-certified banana producers in the world(75), one less than Costa Rica.

The RA Sustainable Agriculture Standards (SAS) are organized under five "principles" or themes: planning and management systems, biodiversity conservation, natural resource conservation, improved livelihoods and human wellbeing, sustainable cattle production. SAS distinguishes between "critical criteria" and "continuous improvement criteria." "Critical criteria" include International Labour Organization (ILO) core labor standards (forced labor, child labor, discrimination, and freedom of association). "Continuous improvement criteria" – understood as indicators to improve upon over a six-year cycle – cover living wage, occupational health and safety, and "employment conditions."32 To obtain certification, the company must pass an audit in which it is measured against the critical criteria. To maintain certification, it must sustain compliance with the critical criteria and improve towards compliance with the continuous improvement criteria according to the according to a specific set of parameters.

RA requires SAS audits include a minimum number of workers based on the company's workforce.³³ The

audit must include a minimum of one interview with a union representative where present. RA instructs auditors to conduct off-site interviews "when freedom of association or sexual harassment are identified as high compliance risks." Auditors may but are not required to ask worker representatives to participate in the audit.³⁴ Complaints concerning RA-certified organizations can be submitted to RA or the certification body (CB).³⁵ CBs are required to respond to complaints that have the name of a contact within five days, resolve them within 30 days, provide the complainant information on major findings, record actions taken to resolve complaints, and submit records of complaints to the RA authorization review processes.³⁶

Global G.A.P. (Good Agricultural Practices) sets voluntary standards for "safe, sustainable agriculture worldwide."37 Global G.A.P.'s parent company is Food-PLUS GmbH, which is a limited liability corporation registered in Cologne, Germany. The program was initiated by some of Europe's largest supermarket chains. It is considered the world's most widely implemented farm certification program. No labor unions sit on the board of Global G.A.P. Although Global G.A.P. references worker health and safety and child labor,³⁸ freedom of association rights, discrimination, collective bargaining and living wages do not appear to be part of its purview. According to the Bureau for the Appraisal of Societal Impacts and Costs (BASIC), Global G.A.P. is a "sector-specific standard defined by retailers with an emphasis on food safety first and foremost " (BASIC 2017: 19). About 31% of global banana exports are certified by Global G.A.P. (Ibid.).

³¹See: at https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/business/solutions/certification/agriculture/certificate-search-public-summaries/.

³²See: https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/business/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/03_rainforest-alliance-sustainable-agriculture-standard_en.pdf, pp. 9-11.

 $^{^{33}}$ <100 workers, 10% or minimum 5, whichever higher; 101-500 7% or 10; 501-1,000 5% or 35; more than 1,000 3% or 50. Up to 33% of interviews can be in groups of 5 or less.

³⁴See: https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/business/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/85_rules-planning-conducting-audits_en.pdf, p. 28.

 $^{{\}tt 35} See: \underline{\tt https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/business/sustainable-farming/farm-certification/questions-and-complaints/.}$

³⁶ See: https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/business/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/15_rules-authorization-certification-bodies_en.pdf.

³⁷See: https://www.globalgap.org/uk en/who-we-are/about-us/

³⁸ Original Articles: Engaging with private sector standards: a case study of Global G.A.P., Linda Courtenay Botterill & Carsten, Daugbjerg, Pages 488-504 | Received 07 Dec 2010, Accepted 25 Jul 2011, Published online: 26 Jul 2011.

Findings related to Certification Programs

The survey inquired about both government and private certification. Fewer than a quarter of workers at union and at non-union workplaces reported ever seeing government inspectors visiting their workplace. However, over 90 percent of workers reported inspections by private certification programs. [See Figure 13.] The two most common programs identified in the survey are Global G.A.P. (which inspected 96 percent of the workplaces) and Rainforest Alliance (which inspected 87 percent of the workplaces). Some workers (five percent) reported inspections by SA 8000. Workers were asked if they had seen or talked to government or private certification program inspectors. They were

not asked about the conclusions of these visits (whether the workplace passed an inspection, and, if so, what score it received), because it was assumed that this information was not made available to workers.

In interviews, workers noted that management is often alerted one month in advance of upcoming visits from private certification programs. One worker noted that, on the day of the visit all the workers get a new protective mask. This worker said that the interview with field workers takes place in the field, often with the immediate supervisor present.³⁹ He added, "We are told what to say before the inspectors arrive. One supervisor said to us, 'Anyone who f**** up the interview will be immediately fired.'"⁴⁰




Figure 13

³⁹ Author's interview, Guatemala, February 2020.

⁴⁰ Ibid.




Figure 14

This practice of telling workers what to say to certification program inspectors was confirmed by the survey results. The survey revealed that, for the vast majority of inspections occurring at non-union southern workplaces, management told workers what to say to inspectors before the inspectors arrived. On unionized workplaces in the north, 28.5 percent of workers said they were instructed what to say to inspectors prior to their arrival. [See Figure 14.]

Most workers at the non-union workplaces said that managers told them to tell inspectors, "We treat you well, you earn a good salary, and you only work eight hours a day." Other workers added that they were told to inform inspectors, "We give you all the proper benefits according to the law." Several workers – who

worked from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. – were specifically told to say that they "start work at 6am and finish at 3pm." Some workers, who worked 12-hour days and were never paid for overtime, were instructed to say that the company paid overtime wages. One worker, who indicated he was never given protective equipment, said his manager told him, "Tell the inspectors we give you the protective equipment you need to work well." One field worker said his supervisor instructed him: "Don't tell them that the plane fumigates when you are working and that there are no toilet facilities." Interviews with workers reinforced this pattern of managers telling them what to say to inspectors. Often, these were statements made very forcefully and with profanity. For example, one worker said he was aggressively told: "Tell them we treat you well, or we will fire you a**."

Conclusions and Recommendations

This report set out to examine the impact of unionization on labor conditions in Guatemala's banana export sector. It did so through a survey of over 200 workers, as well as extensive interviews, an examination of trade data, and a review of relevant prior research. One of the main findings of this report was that Guatemala became the third largest exporter of bananas in the world not only through a history of high-quality production and efficiency, but also by taking advantage of low-paid, non-union labor on the country's southern coast.

The survey data indicate that non-unionized workers earn less than half the hourly pay of unionized workers and work 12 hours more per week than their unionized counterparts. Non-union workers are 81 percent more likely to face verbal abuse than union workers, and 58 percent of women in non-union banana packing plants face sexual harassment at work compared to eight percent of women at unionized packing plants.

All of the above labor rights violations take place at enterprises that are inspected by private certification programs, including Global G.A.P. and Rainforest Alliance. Survey findings indicate that management tells workers what to say to the inspectors before inspectors arrive at 86 percent of non-union workplaces. Government inspections are slightly less common at non-unionized workplaces. Workers at fewer than 25 percent of workplaces report seeing a government inspector visit the workplace.

The clearest conclusion from these findings is that unionization makes an enormous difference in workers' living standards and the conditions of labor. Unions dramatically increase wages, ensure acceptable hours of work, contribute to less verbal abuse and sexual harassment, and provide for safer workplaces. The question then is why no workers on the southern coast are unionized and what can be done to change that situation.

Certainly, there is a need for unions to increase their organizing efforts. But Guatemala has a long history of union repression, which has been very violent. Most banana farms are located in regions of the country where numerous labor activists have been killed. Thus, as a very first step, the government of Guatemala must make use of all the means at its disposal to stop the killings. Guatemalan labor law and enforcement mechanisms are also in need of reform. Laws facilitating unionization, increasing labor inspections, and creating stiffer penalties for violations that are paid in full are basic and necessary steps in this direction.

As this report makes clear, the root causes for the push for low wages goes up to the top of the supply chain. While fruit companies once wielded inordinate power in the production process, that power is slowly being displaced by mega supermarkets that constantly look for ways to squeeze down on prices. This squeeze by retailers on fruit companies contributes to the push to find lower-cost production sites through outsourcing to local producers, who then squeeze labor through low wages, long hours of work, and an ever-increasing pace of production. To address this global supply chain problem, there is a need for much greater transparency in how retailers and fruit MNCs price the product such that the total cost allows for decent work and sustainable production. Put simply, the price paid for a banana must include the full cost of living wages for normal working hours at an acceptable pace of production, and in workplaces that are safe for the workers and for the surrounding environment.

Retailer pressure does not exonerate fruit companies from their role in addressing the worker rights abuses documented in this report. Fruit companies with a significant presence in Guatemala (Del Monte, Chiquita, and Dole) must ensure full compliance with labor standards at their directly-owned facilities and their outsourced facilities. All fruit companies should adopt a zero-tolerance policy with regard to work-

ers' rights violations at outsourced facilities on the southern coast. Twelve-hour workdays, poverty-level wages, sexual harassment, verbal abuse, inhumane production targets, and union avoidance practices must cease. Contracts with suppliers who persistently violate workers' rights should be terminated.

Finally, certification programs must do a better job in monitoring social as well as environmental standards. Visits must be unannounced and interviews with workers should be conducted away from the workplace. Hours of work should be tracked using methods developed for decades by labor inspectors: by sitting, unannounced, outside a workplace and tracing when workers arrive and when they leave. To document sex-

ual harassment, female workers should be interviewed by female inspectors away from the workplace and outside the home to ensure complete privacy from management, co-workers, and spouses. Lastly, certification programs must dramatically improve their expertise in documenting freedom of association violations.

Banana workers on Guatemala's southern coast are facing unacceptable conditions of work. Local employers, fruit companies, the government of Guatemala, labor unions, certification programs and most especially the mega supermarket chains that exert enormous leverage over supply chains must play a role in transforming this situation so that workers can enjoy the jobs with dignity that they deserve.

References

- ASIES. 1991. Mas de 100 Años del Movimiento Obrero Urbano en Guatemala, Tomo I: Artesaños y Obreros en el Periodo Liberal (1877-1944). Guatemala City: Asociación de Investiagación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES).
- BASIC. 2017. New Zealand Bananas: The Big Squeeze. Paris: Bureau for the Appraisal of Societal Impacts and Costs (BASIC).
- Chapman, Peter. 2007. Bananas: How the United Fruit Company Shaped the World. New York: Canongate.
- Cooper, Anna, and Victor Quesada. 2015. *Labour relations: Successful cases within the banana industry*. Rome: World Banana Forum (WBF) Working Group on Labour Rights (WG03).
- Forster, Cindy. 2003. "The Macondo of Guatemala': Banana Workers and National Revolutions in Tiquisate, 1944-1954." In *Banana Wars: Power, Production, and History in the Americas*, eds. Steve Striffler and Mark Mobergy. Durham: Duke University Press. 191-228.
- Frundt, Henry J. 2005. "Toward a Hegemonic Resolution in the Banana Trade." *International Political Science Review* 26 (2): 215-237.
- Goldston, James. 1989. Shattered Hope: Guatemalan Workers and the Promise of Democracy. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Koeppel, Dan. 2009. *Banana: The Fate of the Fruit that Changed the World*. New York: Plume/Penguin.
- Schlesinger, Stephen, and Stephen Kinzer. Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday.

Appendix One: List of Labor Unionists Killed in Guatemala (2004-2018)

	Victim	Gender	Union	Location of Killing	Year
1	Domingo Nach Hernández	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Villa Canales	Ciudad de Guatemala	2018
2	Alejandro García Felipe Hernández	М	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Salud de Guatemala (SNTSG)	Escuintla	2018
3	Juan Carlos Chavarría Cruz	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Melchor de Mencos	Petén	2018
4	Juana Raymundo	F	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Salud de Guatemala (SNTSG)	Quiche	2018
5	David Figueroa García	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Centro Universitario de Petén (CUDEP)	Petén	2018
6	Tomás Francisco Ochoa Salazar	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de Carnes Procesadas, S. A. (SITRABREMEN)	Ciudad de Guatemala	2017
7	Eugenio López y López	М	Extrabajadores de la Finca Eugenio Piedra Parada	Quetzaltenango	2017
8	Candelaria May Cuc	F	Sindicato de trabajadores y Trabajadoras Comerciantes Independientes del Municipio de Cobán del Departamento de Alta Verapaz (SITRACOMERCIANTESCOBAN)	Alta Verapaz	2017
9	Silvia Marina Calderon Uribio	F	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Comité Nacional de Alfabetización (SITRACONALFA)	Suchitepequez	2016
10	Brenda Marleni Estrada Tambito	F	Unión Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA)	Ciudad de Guatemala	2016
11	Eliseo Villatoro	М	Sindicato de Empleados Municipales de Tiquisate	Escuintla	2016
12	Mynor Rolando Ramos Castillo	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Jalapa (SITRAMJ)	Jalapa	2015
13	Adrián Emilio Pérez Velásquez	М	No consta		2015
14	Luis Arnoldo López Esteban	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Transporte en Servicio Publico de Ciudad Pedro de Alvarado (SITRASEPUCPA)	Jutiapa	2014
15	Joaquín Chiroy y Chiroy	М	Market Workers' Union	Sololá	2014
16	Gabriel Enrique Ciramagua Ruiz	М	Zacapa municipal workers' union SITRAMUZAC	Zacapa	2014
17	Edwin Giovanni de la Cruz Aguilar	М	Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala (CUSG)	Jalapa	2014
18	Eduardo Martínez Barrios	M	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Construccion y Servicios de Guatemala (SINCSG)	?	2014
19	Genar Efrén Estrada Navas	M	Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala (CUSG)	Jalapa	2014
20	Marlon Dagoberto Velásquez López	М	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Construccion y Servicios de Guatemala (SINCSG)	Quetzaltenango	2014
21	William Leonel Retana Carias	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Jalapa	Jalapa	2014
22	Manuel de Jesús Ortiz Jiménez	M	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Jalapa	Jalapa	2014
23	Gerardo de Jesús Carrillo Navas	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Jalapa	Jalapa	2014
24	Carlos Antonio Hernández Mendoza	M	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Salud de Guatemala	Chiquimula	2013
25	Joel González Pérez	М	Sindicato de trabajadores de la empresa agropecuaria Omagua S.A.	Izabal	2013
26	Juan Martínez Matute	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Servicio del Transporte de Ciudad Pedro Alvarado (SITRASEPUCPA)	Jutiapa	2013
27	Mayro Rodolfo Juárez	М	Sindicato de la Gremial de Taxistas de Izabal (SIGTADI)	Izabal	2013
28	Julio Alfredo Peña Linares	М	Representante del Grupo Coaligado de Trabajadores de la Empresa Representaciones de Transportes Marítimos, Sociedad Anónima (RTM)	Ş	2013
29	Jorge Ricardo Barrera Barco	М	SPASG	?	2013
30	Jerónimo Sol Ajcot	М	Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC)	Sololá	2013
31	Kira Zulueta Enríquez Mena	F	Secretaria General del Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Nueva Concepción	Escuintla	2013
32	Genaro Cruz Telón	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de Salud de Guatemala (SNTSG)	Izabal	2013
33	Santa Alvarado Cajchum	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de Salud de Guatemala (SNTSG)	Tononicapan	2013
34	Manuel de Jesús Ramírez	М	Sindicato de la Defensa Pública Penal	Ciudad de Guatemala	2012
35	Miguel Ángel González Ramírez	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros (SITRABI)	Izabal	2012

	Victim	Gender	Union	Location of Killing	Year
36	Roberto Oswaldo Ramos Gómez	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Coatepeque	Quetzaltenango	2012
37	Wilder Hugo Barrios López	М	Sindicato de Microbuseros Urbanos del Sector Magnolia	Quetzaltenango	2012
38	Hugo Leonel Acevedo Agustín	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de Chiquimula (SITRAMUNICH)	Chiquimula	2012
39	José Ricardo Morataya Lemus	М	Abogado Laboralista relacionado con la Internacional de Servicios Público (ISP)	Chiquimula	2012
40	Enrique Ortíz	М	Presidente del Comité CODECA		2012
41	Ángel Alfonso Tzul Ajché	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Ingenio Palo Gordo Sociedad Anónima	Suchitepequez	2012
42	Luis Ovidio Ortiz Cajas	М	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Salud Guatemala	Ciudad de Guatemala	2012
43	Byron Aroldo Arreaga Rosales	М	SITRASEREPRO, 2o. Registro de la Propiedad	Quetzaltenango	2011
44	Idar Joel Hernandez Godoy	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabal (SITRABI)	Izabal	2011
45	Oscar Humberto González Vázquez	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabal (SITRABI)	Izabal	2011
46	Lorenzo Godoy Asensio	М	Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG)		
47	Henry Aníbal Marroquín Orellana	М			
48	Pablino Yaque Cervantes	М			
49	Miguel Ángel Felipe Sagastume	М			
50	Héctor Alfonso Martínez Cardona	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabal (SITRABI)		
51	Mardo de Jesús Morales Cardona	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabal (SITRABI)		
52	Esvin Carol Gálvez	М	SGTSG Filial Hospital Nac. de Retalhuleu	Retalhuleu	2011
53	Pedro Antonio García	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Municipales Malacatán	San Marcos	2010
54	Samuel Ramirez Paredes	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Panchoy	Ciudad de Guatemala	2010
55	Juan Fidel Pacheco Coc	М	Sindicato de la Unión de empleados de migración	Ciudad de Guatemala	2010
56	Hector García Véliz	М	Sindicato de trabajadores del Hotel Las Américas S.A Profesionales en Hotel S.A. Anexos y conexos	Ciudad de Guatemala	2010
57	Everilda Ramirez Reyes	F	Presidenta de FRENA		
58	Bruno Ernesto Figueroa	М	Secretario de Finanzas de la Sub Filial del Sistema de Integración de Atención en Salud del SNTSG		
59	David Pineda Barahona	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Departamento de Malaria		
60	Luis Felipe Cho	М	Sindicato de la Municipalidad de Santa Cruz	Ciudad de Guatemala	2010
61	David Abigael Miranda Fuentes	М	Sindicato de trabajadores del Comercio de Coatepeque	Quetzaltenango	2009
62	Sergio Ramírez Buezo	М	Sindicato de trabajadores del Comercio de Coatepeque	Quetzaltenango	2009
63	Julian Capriel Marroquin	М	Sindicato de Vendedores de la Plaza Pública de Jocotán	Chiquimula	2009
64	Víctor Alejandro Soyos Suret	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Dirección de Investigaciones Criminalísticas del Ministerio Público (SITRADICMP)	Ciudad de Guatemala	2009
65	Miguel Chacaj Jax	М	Sindicato de trabajadores del comercio de Coatepeque	Quetzaltenango	2009
66	Pedro Ramírez de la Cruz	М	Consejo nacional Indígena Campesino (CNIC)		
67	Wilson Odair Morales Cordón	М	Miembro del Frente de Lucha Nacional (FNL)		
68	Victor Manuel Gálvez	М	Miembro del Frente de Lucha Nacional (FNL)		
69	Inmer Orlando Boror Zet	М	Dirigente comunitario de San Juan Sacatepéquez		
70	Adolfo Ich Chaman	М	Miembro del Frente de Lucha Nacional (FNL)		
71	Jorge Humberto Andrade Elías	М	Miembro del Frente de Lucha Nacional (FNL)		
72	Olga Marina Ramirez Sanse	F	Sindicato Gremial de Vendedores del Oriente	Chiquimula	2009
73	Julio Pop Choc	М	Sindicato de Salud	Quiche	2009
74	Amado Monzón	М	Sindicato de trabajadores del Comercio de Coatepeque	Quetzaltenango	2009
75	Diego Chiti Pú	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Comercio de Coatepeque	Quetzaltenango	2009

	Victim	Gender	Union	Location of Killing	Year
76	Luis Arnoldo Garcia Avila	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Comercio de Coatepeque	Quetzaltenango	2009
77	Jesús Ernesto Guarcax González	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación	Sololá	2009
78	José Israel Romero Ixtacuy	М	Sindicato de la empresa Hidroeléctrica Municipal	Retalhuleu	2008
79	Jaime Nery Gonzáles	М	Sindicato de vendedores del comercio del departamento de Jutiapa	Jutiapa	2008
80	Lucy Martínez Zúñiga	F	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Sistema Penitenciario	Ciudad de Guatemala	2008
81	Edmundo Noe Herrera Chávez	М	Sindicato de trabajadores de la Universidad Rafael Landívar (SINTRAURL)	Ciudad de Guatemala	2008
82	Armando Donaldo Sánchez Betancourt	М	Sindicato de comerciantes de Coatepeque	Quetzaltenango	2008
83	Freddy Morales Villagrán	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Distribuidora El Petén (SITRAPETEN)	Petén	2008
84	Mario Caal Bolom	М	Comité de Unidad Campesina	Izabal	2008
85	Marvin Leonel Arevalo Aguilar	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores del Transporte pesado	Izabal	2008
86	Sergio Miguel García	М	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Salud de Guatemala (SNTSG)	Izabal	2008
87	Carlos Enrique Cruz Hernández	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabal (SITRABI)	Izabal	2008
88	Miguel Angel Ramirez Enriquez	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros del Sur (SITRABANSUR)	Escuintla	2008
89	Maura Antonieta Hernéndez Cortéz	F	Sindicato en formación del sistema penitenciario	Ciudad de Guatemala	2008
90	Julio César Ixcoy García	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Municipalidad de San Miguel Pochuta	Chimaltenango	2007
91	Marco Tulio Ramirez Portela	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros del Departamento de Izabal	Izabal	2007
92	Salvador del Cid Hernández	М	Sindicato de la Municipalidad de Acasaguastlán	El Progreso	2007
93	Matías Mejía Hernández	M	Miembro del Frente de Lucha Nacional (FNL)		
94	Pedro Zamora	М	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Portuaria Quetzal	Quetzaltenango	2007
95	Rosalío Maldonado Lorenzo Cuxil	M	Sindicato de Mototaxis de Jalapa	Jalapa	2007
96	Juana María Chojlan Pelico	F	Afiliada CODECA		
97	Lisinio Aguirre Trujillo	М	Sindicato de Salud en la filial de Puerto Barrios	Izabal	2007
98	Walter Anibal Ixcaquic Mendoza	М	Sindicato del frente de vendedores de Guatemala	Ciudad de Guatemala	2007
99	Norma Jeannette Zente de Ixcaquic	М	Sindicato del frente de vendedores de Guatemala	Jalapa	2007
100	Luis Arturo Quinteros Chinchilla	М	Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG)		2005
101	Julio Rolando Raquec Ishen	М	Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Informales (FESTRI)		2004

Sources: Red de Defensores de Derechos Laborales de Guatemala (REDGL), ILO, Movimiento Sindical, Indígena, y Campesino Guatemalteco (MISCG).

Appendix Two

Survey, Summary Statistics (n=210)								
	Number	Percentage						
Men	138	65.7%						
Women	72	34.3%						
Single/Separated	64	30.0%						
Married/Partnered	146	70.0%						
North	125	59.5%						
South	85	40.5%						
Work in the Field	95	45.9%						
Work in the Packing Plant	112	54.1%						
Age								
18-25	35	16.7%						
26-39	114	54.3%						
40+	61	29.0%						
Average years of education	5.7							
MNC								
Dole	81	38.6%						
Chiquita	44	21.0%						
Del Monte	84	40.0%						
Don't know	1	0.5%						
Ownership								
Direct MNC Ownership	98	46.7%						
Indirect, Guatemalan Owners	108	51.4%						
Don't know	4	1.9%						

Appendix Three: Farm Data from Certification Programs

Certificate Holder Name	Critical Criteria (2017)	Level C (2017)	Primary Cert Holder Contact	Primary Cert Holder Contact: Work Email	Total Hectares	Approved Production Hectares	Total Workers	Certification Body
Finca Guayacán - Palo Blanco S. A.	100	94.12	Francis W. Bruderer	fwbruderer@gmail.com	327	323	0	CERES
Finca Palo Blanco - Palo Blanco, S.A.	100	97.06	Francis Bruderer	fwbruderer@gmail.com	362	358	340	CERES
Finca La Ceiba - Palo Blanco S. A.	100	91.18	Francis Bruderer	fwbruderer@gmail.com	233	230	227	CERES
Finca San Miguel Sur - Palo Blanco, S. A.	100	88.24	Boris Niños	enc.ambiente@fincaprimavera.net	231	228	0	CERES
Finca San Miguel Norte	100	91.18	Boris Niños	enc.ambiente@fincaprimavera.net	182	179	189	CERES
Finca Las Acacias - Palo Blanco, S. A.	100	94.12	Francias W. Bruderer	fwbruderer@gmail.com	308	305	0	CERES
Finca Primavera - Palo Blanco, S. A.	100	93.94	Francis Bruderer	fwbruderer@gmail.com	328	324	0	CERES
Finca Tacaná	100	91.18	Boris A. Niños	enc.ambiente@fincaprimavera.net	372	369	0	CERES
Finca El Toro - Palo Blanco, S.A.	100	94.12	Francis Bruderer	fwbruderer@gmail.com	287	284	0	CERES
Finca Tolimán 3 - Agropecuaria El Siglo, S.A.	100	88.57	Osmar Mérida Salic	gerentefinanciero@grupometrocorp.com	188	187	163	RA-Cert
Agropecuaria Entre Ríos S.A.	100	80	Jorge Alexander Herrera Sazo	jhmedioambiente@gmail.com	296	290	295	RA-Cert
Finca Tolimán 1 - Agropecuaria El Siglo, S.A.	100	86.11	Osmar Mérida Salic	gerentefinanciero@grupometrocorp.com	172	170	240	RA-Cert
Vista Bella No. 1	100	88.89	Elder Samuel Aldana Rodas	ealdana@frutera.net	370	364	377	RA-Cert
Finca Arriondas	100	79.41	Jorge Alexander Herrera Sazo	jhmedioambiente@gmail.com	340	334	344	RA-Cert
Santa Ana 2	100	83.33	Nestor Ochoa Roldan	eramirez@montanesa.net	220	218	223	RA-Cert
Santa Ana 1	100	83.33	Nestor Ochoa Roldan	eramirez@montanesa.net	196	194	223	RA-Cert
Bananera Tepeyac S. A Finca Tepeyac 1, 2 y Nueva Esperanza	100	85.71	Miguel Abraham Montoya	miguel.montoya@dole.com	763	748	702	RA-Cert
Finca Tolimán 4 - Agropecuaria El Siglo, S.A.	100	83.33	Osmar Mérida Salic	gerentefinanciero@grupometrocorp.com	200	199	169	NEPCon
Finca El Alamo No. 9	100	94.59	Gustavo Alejandro Chacón	gchacon@olmeca.com.gt	243	242	225	NEPCon
Finca Santa Rosita II - Rosmar, S.A.	100	94.44	Max Edgar de Jesus Gonzalez	cperez@rosbana.com	251	240	301	NEPCon
Finca La Fe 2	100	92.31	ELDER SAMUEL ALDANA RODAS	ealdana@frutera.net	250	243	0	NEPCon
Finca Ipala II - Bananera Super Amigos S. A.	100	97.22	Elder Samuel Aldana Rodas	esar2940@gmail.com	201	201	220	NEPCon
Finca Santa Rosita I - Rosmar, S.A.	100	94.44	Max Edgar de Jesus Gonzalez	cperez@rosbana.com	261	256	301	NEPCon
Finca Bellamar 10	100	80.56	Samuel Barrios Orozco	sbarrios@olmeca.com.gt	318	317	334	NEPCon
Agrícola San José, S. A.	100	97.14	Óscar Fernando García Cordón	fergarcor@gmail.com	222	214	249	NEPCon
Finca La Fe No. 1	100	87.18	ELDER SAMUEL ALDANA RODAS	ealdana@frutera.net	270	263	245	NEPCon
Finca Nueva Esmeralda - Plantaciones Nahualate S.A.	100	91.89	Pedro Peneleu	pedropeneleu93@hotmail.com	115	112	160	NEPCon
Las Vegas No.2	100	87.18	ELDER SAMUEL ALDANA RODAS	ealdana@frutera.net	243	239	324	NEPCon
Finca Bellamar 08	100	80.56	Samuel Barrios Orozco	sbarrios@olmeca.com.gt	314	312	344	NEPCon
Finca Tacuba 5	100	94.44	Marco Antonio Hernhandez	mhernandez@olmeca.com.gt	211	210	239	NEPCon

Certificate Holder Name	Critical Criteria (2017)	Level C (2017)	Primary Cert Holder Contact	Primary Cert Holder Contact: Work Email	Total Hectares	Approved Production Hectares	Total Workers	Certification Body
El Álamo S.A Finca No. 8	100	91.89	Gustavo Alejandro Chacón	gchacon@olmeca.com.gt	234	233	364	NEPCon
Finca Bellamar 12	100	83.33	Merlyn Guzmán Figueroa	mguzman@olmeca.com.gt	310	308	0	NEPCon
Finca Bellamar 09	100	86.11	Samuel Barrios Orozco	sbarrios@olmeca.com.gt	300	298	337	NEPCon
Finca Santa Irene 1 - Plantaciones Nahualate S.A.	100	91.89	Pedro Peneleu	pedropeneleu93@hotmail.com	337	310	320	NEPCon
Chiquita Guatemala, S.A.	100	77.78	Ernesto Montoya	emontoya@chiquita.com	2,283	1,906	2718	NEPCon
Finca Nogales - Compañía Agrícola Independencia, S.A.	100	97.22	Armando López	kawasaki345@hotmail.com	130	127	128	NEPCon
Finca Laurel - Rosmar, S.A.	100	91.67	Max Edgar de Jesus Gonzalez	cperez@rosbana.com	308	307	602	NEPCon
Finca Tazmania No. 1	100	89.74	ELDER SAMUEL ALDANA RODAS	ealdana@frutera.net	210	205	269	NEPCon
Finca El Cedro - Rosmar, S.A.	100	94.44	Max Edgar de Jesus Gonzalez	cperez@rosbana.com	241	240	301	NEPCon
Finca Ipala I - Bananera Super Amigos S.A.	100	97.22	Elder Samuel Aldana Rodas	esar2940@gmail.com	221	221	230	NEPCon
Tazmania No. 2	100	89.74	Elder Samuel Aldana Rodas	ealdana@agroamerica.com	140	137	214	NEPCon
Finca Bellamar 13	100	88.89	Samuel Barrios Orozco	sbarrios@olmeca.com.gt	357	355	0	NEPCon
Las Vegas No. 1	100	91.89	ELDER SAMUEL ALDANA RODAS	ealdana@frutera.net	249	243	417	NEPCon
Plantas del Sur, S.AFinca El Roble	100	91.43	Jorge Alexander Herrera Sazo	jhmedioambiente@gmail.com	233	228	250	NEPCon
El Alamo S.A Finca No. 16	100	94.59	Gustavo Alejandro Chacón	gchacon@olmeca.com.gt	347	346	332	NEPCon
Finca Tacuba 6	100	94.44	Marco Antonio Hernhandez	mhernandez@olmeca.com.gt	256	255	270	NEPCon
Bananera Marinalá, S.A Finca Marínala 1 y 2	100	91.67	Rony Orlando García Calderón	rony.garcia@banmarsa.com	595	445	391	NEPCon
Finca Tacuba 4	100	94.44	Marco Antonio Hernandez	mhernandez@olmeca.com.gt	230	229	303	NEPCon
Finca Bellamar 11	100	80.56	Samuel Barrios Orozco	sbarrios@olmeca.com.gt	318	316	352	NEPCon
Finca Santa Irene 2 - Plantaciones Nahualate, S.A.	100	91.89	Pedro Peneleu	pedropeneleu93@hotmail.com	300	296	300	NEPCon
Finca Bellamar 16 - Agroservicios San Rafael, S.A.	100	86.11	Gustavo Alejandro Chacón	gchacon@olmeca.com.gt	261	259	315	NEPCon
Finca Santa Irene 3-Plantaciones Nahualate, S.A.	100	91.89	Pedro Peneleu	pedropeneleu93@hotmail.com	232	230	310	NEPCon
Finca Bellamar 15 - Agroservicios San Rafael, S.A.	100	83.33	Gustavo Alejandro Chacón	gchacon@olmeca.com.gt	269	267	0	NEPCon
Compañía de Desarrollo Bananero de Guatemala, S.A. / Finca Yaqui	100	86.11	Otto Lavagnino	olavagnino@freshdelmonte.com	619	559	444	NEPCon
Finca San Francisco 1, 2 y 3 - Bananera Tepeyac S.A.	100	94.29	Rony Orlando García C	rony.garcia@banmarsa.com	859	845	1025	NEPCon
Finca El Rosario No.1	100	89.74	Elder Aldana	ealdana@frutera.net	233	226	359	NEPCon
Finca La Fe No. 3 - Frutera del Pacifico, S.A.	100	87.18	Elder Aldana	ealdana@frutera.net	204	199	183	NEPCon
Palo Blanco - Sureña, S.A.	100	88.89	Gustavo Cristales	basan@sion.com.gt	376	374	596	Naturacert
San Juan la Selva	100	88.89	Victor Alvarez	valvarez@sion.com.gt	340	336	335	Naturacert
Finca Tacuba 2	100	86.49	Marco Antonio Hernandez	mhernandez@olmeca.com.gt	274	273	304	Naturacert
Finca Imara IV	100	94.44	JOSE LUIS ASENSIO AGUIRRE	jobeluce@gmail.com	223	211	588	Naturacert

Certificate Holder Name	Critical Criteria (2017)	Level C (2017)	Primary Cert Holder Contact	Primary Cert Holder Contact: Work Email	Total Hectares	Approved Production Hectares	Total Workers	Certification Body
Distrito 2 (Fincas 98-99) - Bananera Nacional S.A.	100	97.3	Lanny Azucena Fuentes	Ifuentes@banasa.net	463	460	724	Naturacert
Distrito 3 (Fincas 07-06-05-01-96) - Bananera Nacional S.A.	100	97.22	Lanny Azucena Fuentes	Ifuentes@banasa.net	999	972	1022	Naturacert
Finca Imara II	100	94.44	JOSE LUIS ASENSIO AGUIRRE	jobeluce@gmail.com	262	251	301	Naturacert
Finca Murciélagos	100	91.89	Victor Alvarez	valvarez@sion.com.gt	276	234	209	Naturacert
Finca Tacuba 1	100	91.18	Marco Antonio Hernandez	mhernandez@olmeca.com.gt	333	295	355	Naturacert
Distrito 4 (Fincas 02-03) - Bananera Nacional S.A.	100	97.3	Lanny Azucena Fuentes	Ifuentes@banasa.net	478	459	512	Naturacert
Finca Tacuba 3	100	88.24	Marco Antonio Hernandez	mhernandez@olmeca.com.gt	274	272	303	Naturacert
Finca Tacuba 7	100	91.43	Marco Antonio Hernhandez	mhernandez@olmeca.com.gt	240	239	266	Naturacert
Finca Imara I	100	94.44	José Luis Asencio Aguirre	jobeluce@gmail.com	328	316	360	Naturacert
Distrito 1 (Fincas 09-10-97) - Bananera Nacional S.A.	100	97.3	Lanny Azucena Fuentes	Ifuentes@banasa.net	837	824	1010	Naturacert
Finca Imara III	100	94.44	Omer Estuardo Zometa Hernandez	estuardo.zometa@gmail.com	251	240	301	Naturacert
La Libertad No. 1	100	94.44	Mario Alberto García Salas	semagro@hotmail.com	212	204	200	Naturacert
Corpoagro del Pacifico, S.AFinca Las Vegas 02	100	88.89	Fabian Ramirez Barrios	framirez@corpacsa.com	323	304	739	Naturacert
Distrito 5 (Fincas 01-02-03) - Bananera Nacional, S.A.	100	97.14	Lanny Fuentes	Ifuentes@banasa.net		543	978	Naturacert